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Abstract: We examine the impact of overdue debts in small villages in one of Hungary’s most dis-
advantaged regions. We find that a significant number of debtors with overdue debts permanently 
escape from debt collectors. Accordingly, in our sample, overdue debts reduce the likelihood of 
declared work by 14 percentage points on average. The lack of declared work alone reduces the 
probability of opening a bank account by 21 percentage points, and overdue debts further reduce it 
by 9 percentage points. The negative effect of overdue debts on health is almost as large as the pos-
itive effect of a high school diploma. In addition, the health-destroying effect extends not only to the 
debtor but to all members of the household. Therefore, overdue debts create a poverty trap mecha-
nism exacerbating financial exclusion, hence resulting in significant losses for both the individual 
and society. We recommend paying more attention to smoothing credit cycles and resolving non-
performing debt obligations. 
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1. Introduction 
Non-performing, overdue debts are regularly incurred in credit cycles, usually to an 
accelerated extent after a crisis. It is well-documented in the literature that employment is 
an important factor in repaying household loans. If someone loses their job, the probabil-
ity of non-payment increases significantly (Ben-Galim and Lanning 2010; Balás et al. 2015; 
Campbell and Cocco 2015; Dimitrios et al. 2016). Some recent papers recognized, how-
ever, that there is reverse causality, too, as overdue debts have a negative effect on em-
ployment as well. According to Mian and Sufi (2014), through the housing net worth 
channel, a decline in the housing net worth reduces consumer demand, hence labor de-
mand. Similarly, Verner and Gyöngyösi (2020) showed that overdue foreign currency 
mortgage loans reduced aggregate demand, leading to job losses, and, thus lowering em-
ployment levels and economic growth. However, overdue debts can reduce not only labor 
demand but also labor supply. For example, through the financial distress channel, 
deteriorating creditworthiness reduces an employee’s chances of finding a job, keeping a 
job, or choosing working conditions (Herkenhoff 2019; Dobbie et al. 2020). In addition, 
through the housing lock channel, the deterioration in the collateral value of mortgages 
leads to a decrease in or a complete lack of labor mobility (Bernstein and Struyven 2017). 
Bernstein (2017) introduced the household debt overhang channel, which means that due 
to the renegotiation of overdue debts, repayments become income-contingent, hence 
debtors become motivated to hide their incomes.  
In the present study, we investigate the effects of overdue debts on employments, as 
well, but in a specific context. Filling a gap in the literature, we do not analyze the debtors 
in the average situation, but people living in small villages in a disadvantaged region of 
Hungary. A novelty of our research is that we investigate the relationship between over-
due debts and employment in the context of financial exclusion. Financial exclusion is a 
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well-researched area, especially in the US and UK. Still, some vulnerable groups such as 
rural inhabitants are completely neglected (Fernández-Olit et al. 2019), overdue debts do 
not receive enough attention (Krumer-Nevo et al. 2017), and researchers do not ask un-
banked people directly (Koku 2015). Our study fills a gap in all three respects. 
We define debts in a broader sense, including all types that can trigger a debt collec-
tion process in the case of non-payment (utility bills, bank loans, and tax liabilities). We 
introduce a new channel that has so far been unexplored in the literature, such as escape 
from debt collection and deductions. At the first sight, it is similar to the household debt 
overhang channel described by Bernstein (2017), but in our case, debts are not renegoti-
ated, so they remain unresolved for decades. The escape from debt collection can curb 
economic growth in several ways: it can reduce legal employment and the willingness to 
use a bank account. Moreover, it can damage the mental and physical health of the debtors 
and their families in the long run due to the constant stress they live with (Fitch et al. 
2011).  
Relative to the financial literature focusing on the relationship between overdue 
debts and employment, in our sample, overdue debts are more common while the insti-
tutional system dealing with financial difficulties is less developed and accessible. On the 
one hand, the Hungarian personal bankruptcy system is much stricter, hence less attrac-
tive than in the US and most EU countries. On the other hand, in this special segment, 
debt renegotiations with banks or debt collectors are much less effective. Debts are rela-
tively small, communication with debtors is more difficult and costly, and the collateral is 
less valuable compared to the average indebted household. These conditions may explain 
why small overdue debts remain unsettled en masse and for decades, while large non-
performing loans are renegotiated much more efficiently and quickly. Furthermore, larger 
borrowers can obtain significantly larger discounts (Tirole 2006) contrary to moral intui-
tion (Kornai 2016). In our research, the negative effects of overdue debts last typically 
longer than in the financial literature and undermine economic growth and social cohe-
sion across several business cycles. 
Escape from debt collection creates a special poverty trap, as it creates a positive feed-
back mechanism through which poverty is reproduced and even exacerbated (Azariadis 
1996). Due to overdue debts, the lender avoids declared work and electronic payment, 
trying instead to make a living from casual work in the black economy and paying for 
everything in cash. Thus, overdue debtors benefit less from the services of the welfare 
systems (unemployment benefits, health care, pensions, etc.) and formal financial services 
(payment services, savings opportunities, loans, etc.), becoming more vulnerable and be-
ing forced to make worse compromises (Allen et al. 2016).  
Escape from debt collection as a life strategy severely limits the debtors’ and their 
families’ capabilities as defined by Sen (2014). Several kinds of poverty traps, although 
based on different mechanisms, were presented by Banerjee and Duflo (2011), mainly in 
relation to education, health, and financial systems. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) exam-
ined the mechanism of the debt trap, its psychological, behavioral effects, the ‘scarcity 
mindset’, and the role of unexpected expenditures.  
The thought experiment underlying our empirical analysis is what would happen if 
long-standing non-performing loans were renegotiated and restructured (combined with 
partial debt relief), thus the threat of recovery over the debtors’ heads would be averted. 
Our research aims to find out what impact such a program is expected to have on employ-
ment, bank accounts, and the health of the population. 
Krugman (1988) introduced the concept of the so-called debt relief Laffer-curve. Ac-
cording to this concept, debt relief can increase lenders’ income (just like tax cuts can in-
crease tax revenue of the state through improved tax incentives) and, at the same time, a 
borrower’s well-being by removing barriers to employment and financial inclusion 
(World Bank 2012). Kanz (2016) examined the impact of the most extensive debt relief 
program in economic history targeting households (agricultural entrepreneurs) in India 
and found that the expected positive effects had not materialized. On the contrary, the 
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saved debtors had piled up their informal debts and decreased their investments, and 
their productivity had fallen compared to debtors who had not been saved. Mukherjee et 
al. (2018), analyzing the same debt relief program, showed that the situation of those who 
found themselves in difficult situations due to exogenous shocks (weather) and not their 
own faults have significantly improved and became financially more included. Similar 
conclusions were drawn by Dobbie and Song (2020) on a different sample, performing a 
randomized controlled experiment on overdue credit card debts in the US. Ong et al. 
(2019) found that debt relief programs positively affected the mental state of the debtors; 
particularly, anxiety and present-biasedness decreased. Therefore, they supported debt 
relief programs in addressing poverty. 
Academic views regarding the effectiveness of debt relief programs are mixed. More-
over, there are only a few studies in the field, not least because quality data are not avail-
able for research. Creditors have the interest to hide information if they agree with the 
debtor on partial or complete debt relief of non-performing debts, as debt reliefs increase 
moral hazard (Fudenberg and Tirole 1990) and lead to the soft budget constraint syn-
drome (Kornai 1998). In addition, it is the payment discipline of not only the borrowers 
who have received the debt relief that deteriorates in the future (if they expect to be res-
cued again and again) but also of other previously performing debtors if discounts be-
come known. However, examining the decision of US mortgage debtors on strategic de-
fault, Guiso et al. (2013) found that the willingness-to-pay depends also on non-pecuniary 
factors, such as fairness and morality. Bhutta et al. (2017) also concluded that US mortgage 
borrowers are reluctant to walk away even if it were beneficial for them, thus, moral haz-
ard can be lower than suspected. 
It is clear, therefore, that debt relief programs can have significant individual and 
social costs and benefits in the long run. In this light, instruments that can efficiently pre-
vent the excessive build-up of households’ credit risk and are also able to address complex 
tradeoffs in case of crisis can create huge value. The present study is aimed at contributing 
to the development of more efficient debt relief instruments.  
Section 2 discusses the hypotheses of the study. In Section 3, the considered database 
is presented. Section 4 provides a comparative description of households living with and 
without overdue debts. Section 5 analyzes the impacts of overdue debts in a multivariable 
setting. Finally, the conclusions are summarized in Section 6.  
2. Development of Hypotheses 
At the start of this research, we conducted 14 in-depth interviews with local residents, 
mostly women, in a chosen settlement of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (BAZ) County. We col-
lected information on households’ financial management, their savings, and borrowing 
habits. During the interviews, the issue of utility, bank, and other debts and problems 
arising from default was raised several times. 
In many cases, the pattern emerged that the household obtained general-purpose, 
consumer, or mortgage credit(s) from banks either in Hungarian forint (HUF) or in foreign 
currency and then failed to repay them due to some exogenous shock (job loss, health 
deterioration, exchange rate and interest rate changes, etc.). Banks handed over non-per-
forming loans to debt collectors, and, since then, overdue debts have just further accumu-
lated. 
The formal process for dealing with overdue debts can be summarized as follows. 
We distinguish three stages if the debtor does not pay his debt. The recovery phase is the 
first 90 days after arrears, during which the creditor actively contacts the debtor and seeks 
alternative solutions for payment. If the debtor is overdue for more than 90 days (with the 
repayment of a bank loan, utility bill, etc.), the unpaid financial obligation enters the claim 
phase. The lender will usually continue to look for alternative solutions, but the claim will 
be handed over to a claim manager. After 180 days from the date of non-payment, in the 
enforcement phase, the contract is terminated, the claim is sold, and debt is collected based 
on out-of-court or in-court proceedings. In addition to penalty interest, the collection and 
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enforcement costs borne by the debtor can significantly increase the debt’s value. The 
debtor’s assets, income, and movable and immovable property are under the scope of en-
forcement. Hungarian legislation does not recognize the institution of datio in solutum. If 
the collateral of the loan is not sufficient to repay the outstanding debt, the debtor remains 
liable for the outstanding part of the debt. During the enforcement, movable and immov-
able property may be sold to cover the outstanding debt, and a certain amount may be 
automatically deducted from the debtor’s registered tax-paying income before the debtor 
receives it (MNB 2019). Act LIII of 1994 on Judicial Enforcement states that the claim must 
be recovered primarily from the debtor’s wages; the amount recovered may not exceed 
33%, or, exceptionally, 50% (e.g., in case of child support or multiple foreclosures). Ac-
cordingly, the debt collector is required to examine whether the debtor has a declared job. 
Our interviewees, who reported overdue debts, were already in the enforcement 
phase without exception, so all their legal income was subject to a 33% or 50% deduction. 
As the market value of the movable and immovable property is typically very low in this 
segment, foreclosures and evictions were not worthwhile for the debt collectors; conse-
quently, unresolved debts have persisted for many years, and the penalty interest has ac-
cumulated. The initial loans of a few hundred thousand forints have since grown to debts 
of several million. The creditors renounced ever being able to repay these huge sums, so 
they gave up trying. Letters sent by debt collectors are not even opened, the exact amount 
of the debt is not known. The debtors equipped themselves to hide their incomes and 
potential savings from debt collectors throughout their lives. Interviewees reported that, 
in many cases, they do not apply for registered jobs or open a bank account specifically 
because of overdue debts. Overdue debts have a negative effect also on debtors’ mental 
and physical health. They are angry at banks and debt collectors, feel misled, and do not 
want to have any business with the banks, thus accepting their long-term financial exclu-
sion.  
Based on the existing literature and the findings of the in-depth interviews, we for-
mulate the following three hypotheses in relation to the negative impacts of overdue 
debts:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Debtors with overdue debts are less likely to apply for a registered job.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Debtors with overdue debts are less likely to open a bank account.  
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Debtors with overdue debts suffer from worse mental and physical conditions 
than debtors without overdue debts. 
In the following sections, we examine these hypotheses in detail based on the ques-
tionnaire survey. 
3. Data Collection 
To collect targeted data, Soreco Research Limited conducted a questionnaire-based 
survey in March and April 2019, on behalf of the Corvinus University of Budapest and 
under the framework of the “Financial and Public Services” research project of the Higher 
Education Institutional Excellence Program. All the procedures were performed in com-
pliance with relevant laws and institutional research ethical guidelines. The research fo-
cused on the financial management of households in the small settlements of BAZ County. 
The sample is representative of non-urban households in the county. Data were collected 
by personal interviews, via the so-called multistage stratified random sampling proce-
dure. 
In the first stage of the sampling procedure, the settlements to be sampled were se-
lected and the number of households to be interviewed in each settlement was determined 
to reflect the proportion of the non-urban population of the districts. In the second stage 
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of sampling, the interviewers selected the households to be interviewed using a predeter-
mined selection algorithm, the so-called random walk method. In other words, house-
holds were not selected based on a preliminary address list but randomly. In the given 
settlement, there was a pre-recorded starting point. From this starting point, based on a 
fixed-route algorithm, every fifth household was selected for an interview. In each house-
hold, the household member most competent in financial matters was asked to complete 
the questionnaire. If the randomly chosen household refused to respond, the nearest 
household was contacted. Sampling was carried out anonymously, and no personal data 
were collected, so households cannot be identified. 
In total, we have information on 504 households and 1794 individuals; 1196 were of 
active age (18–65 years), and 179 had overdue debts. Households with no active-age mem-
bers were excluded from the analysis. Of the remaining 496 households, 136 were inhab-
ited by individuals who had some form of overdue debts (177 individuals in total). The 
questionnaire included questions for each adult, for the household, and for the respondent 
only. Economic activity, the possession of a bank account, and overdue debts play a key 
role in our analysis, and information on these is known for all adult members of the inter-
viewed households. The majority of the respondents (72%) were women as they were 
more familiar with household financial management. See Appendix A for details on the 
variables used in the analysis. 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, we use data obtained from the questionnaire to characterize the indi-
viduals and households with and without overdue debts. First, we present the results of 
a direct inquiry on what the respondents think about the causal relationships formulated 
in H1, H2, and H3; second, we perform a one-dimensional comparative analysis of their 
characteristics.  
4.1. Direct Inquiry 
In the questionnaire, we asked directly whether the interviewee knows someone 
who, because of his or her overdue debts and the fear of debt collection does not take up 
a declared job (H1), does not open a bank account (H2), or has experienced a deterioration 
in his or her health (H3). Respondents also had to indicate whether this kind of causality 
exists for him- or herself, for a close family member living in the household, for somebody 
in the wider family, or for someone living in the settlement or in a wider circle of acquaint-
ances. 
Nearly half of all respondents (49%) know someone who does not have a declared 
job because of overdue debts. Similarly, nearly half of the respondents reported the nega-
tive effects of overdue debt on bank accounts and health (45% and 58%, respectively). 
Considering only the households with overdue debts, almost a quarter of the respondents 
reported that there is at least one person in their household who, specifically because of 
the outstanding overdue debts, does not take up a declared job (18%), does not open a 
bank account (21%), or has experienced a health deterioration (34%). It is noteworthy that 
the deterioration in health, both in a narrower and wider context, was given greater em-
phasis by the respondents than the other two consequences. 
We examined those households where no one had a bank account (30% of all house-
holds) in more detail. In previous research, representative of the whole country, the pro-
portion of such households was lower: 24% (Illyés and Varga 2015) and 17% (Horn and 
Kiss 2019). In our case, the main reason for the lack of a bank account was that it is not 
needed (60%) and/or it is too expensive (51%), but 21% of the respondents referred to the 
fear of debt collection. At the national level, 90% of those who did not have a bank account 
said they did not need it, 25% said it was too expensive, 10–11% did not trust credit insti-
tutions, and 3–4% feared security risks (Illyés and Varga 2015). We note that the question-
naire of Illyés and Varga (2015) did not include the possibility of fear of debt collection, 
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hence such fears probably appeared in the answers “do not trust credit institutions” and 
“fear of security risks.” Clearly, in our sample (villages of BAZ County), costs play a sig-
nificantly larger role than in the national-level sample, which may be due to lower in-
comes. 
Although not listed in Table 1, we also directly asked the interviewees about the ex-
tent to which overdue debts are a problem in general. According to respondents, this is a 
serious problem in their immediate environment (66%), in the village (81%), and nation-
ally (89%). 
Table 1. Results of the direct inquiry. 
Do You Know Someone, Who—Due to Their Overdue 
Debts and the Fear from Debt Collection...  




Debts (N = 117) 
Within the 
Household 




… does not take up a declared job, because their wage would 
be decreased by deductions. 
6% 49% 18% 
… does not open a bank account, as their debited money 
would be decreased by deductions. 
8% 45% 21% 
… experienced a deterioration in their health. 11% 58% 34% 
* Including the household. Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. Note: 
The table shows how respondents answered our direct inquiry, i.e., whether they knew someone in their environment 
who did not take up a declared job, did not open a bank account, or had experienced a deterioration in their health spe-
cifically because of overdue debts. 
The answers to the above questions are consistent, and we have no reason to suspect 
that the interviewees did not understand the questions or that the answers were signifi-
cantly distorted for other reasons, although smaller biases are possible in both directions. 
At the level of the closest family members, due to the personal involvement and the need 
for self-discharge, the impact of overdue debts may be somewhat exaggerated. On the 
other hand, respondents are likely to admit neither overdue debts nor hiding from en-
forcement. Therefore, the two opposite biases may extinguish each other to some extent. 
At the same time, at the level of a wider circle of acquaintances, the lack of information 
may have skewed the responses downwards. Nevertheless, if there is some bias, the re-
spondents are more likely to present the problem as being less severe than it is. The above 
results, therefore, support our hypotheses based on in-depth interviews. 
4.2. Comparative Analysis  
Next, analyzing the answers to the questionnaire, we examine whether the statistical 
characteristics of the sample are consistent with our hypotheses. Our primary goal is to 
characterize individuals and households with and without overdue debts. In some cases 
when data were missing, observations were removed from the sample. Table 2 shows the 
extent to which the subsamples of individuals with (179 individuals) and without (1017) 
overdue debts differ from each other. Variables in bold are included in the multivariate 
regression analysis to examine the combined effects of the variables (in Section 5). 
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Variables related to individuals     
1196 Full-time job 11% 42% *** 0.000 
1196 Declared work 13% 45% *** 0.000 
1183 Gender (women) 50% 50% 0.970 
1196 Age (year) 42.9 39.2 *** 0.000 
1196 Education (less than elementary school) 21% 4% *** 0.000 
1196 Education (high school diploma) 3% 27% *** 0.000 
1196 Net income (thousand HUF)  60.4  95.8 *** 0.000 
1157 Bank account 32% 60% *** 0.000 
286 Loan instalment (thousand HUF) 21.0 28.9 *** 0.000 
Variables related to households    
1196 Household members 3.3 3.6 ** 0.029 
1196 Children 1.7 1.3 *** 0.004 
1151 Income per capita (thousand HUF) 52.3 90.6 *** 0.000 
1160 Forex loan 21% 20% 0.576 
1143 Ability-to-pay 1.0 1.2 *** 0.000 
1196 Social aversion to overdue debts 0.2 0.3 ** 0.034 
1196 Social aversion to non-declared work 0.2 0.2 0.964 
1165 Settlement development 40.9 42.4 0.112 
1165 Chronic illness 31% 21% *** 0.010 
Variables related to the respondents    
496 Smoking 56% 38% *** 0.001 
496 Alcohol 1% 3% * 0.093 
493 Medication 38% 38% 0.893 
496 Stressed 60% 36% *** 0.000 
495 Hopeless 48% 22% *** 0.000 
495 Tired 65% 46% *** 0.000 
496 Unhappy 51% 24% *** 0.000 
496 Not socializing 37% 55% *** 0.000 
496 Satisfied with health 48% 56% 0.126 
Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary 2019. Note: The table shows the average 
values of the variables for the subsamples of individuals or households with and without overdue debts. The description 
of the variables can be found in Appendix A. Differences were tested with the independent t-test, the Mann–Whitney test, 
or the Kruskal–Wallis test depending on the distribution of variables in the subsamples. We reject the null hypothesis of 
independence if the p−value is smaller than the benchmark significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10% (marked with ***, **, or 
*, respectively). 
Looking at the full-time jobs or all declared jobs in Table 2, the difference is notable 
for the two subsamples (31 and 32 percentage points, respectively) and statistically 
significant. Hence, there is a close negative association between employment and overdue 
debts. However, it is not clear whether overdue debts cause lower employment (overdue 
debts → employment) or vice versa, the lack of employment causes non-payment 
(employment → overdue debts). It is likely that both effects occur simultaneously and this 
positive feedback loop creates a vicious circle leading to a poverty trap. Considering that 
the year 2019 (when the survey was taken) was characterized by a strong economic boom 
and general labor shortages, we can assume that the causality of interest (overdue debts 
→ employment) was strongly present as someone who wanted a full-time and declared 
job during this period had plenty of opportunities. Anecdotes also support the fact that, 
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in many cases, employers offer special employment contracts specifically designed to 
avoid deductions (for example, by paying the wages in cash with daily settlements); 
moreover, some foreign job opportunities have been advertised explicitly as a tool to 
evade debt collections.  
There is no difference in gender between those with overdue debts and those 
without. Those with overdue debts are a few years older, but the difference, while 
statistically significant, is not remarkable. Figure 1 shows that the relationship is non-
linear (middle-aged people are more likely to take out a loan and more likely to become 
insolvent than young or older people). 
 
Figure 1. Distributions of age in the subsamples of individuals with and without overdue debts. Source: Questionnaire-
based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. 
In terms of education, we found a significant difference (Mann–Whitney test p-value 
= 0.000) between the two subsamples. Those with overdue debts have a lower education 
level in general. Among them, the proportion of those who have not completed the eight 
classes of elementary school is significantly higher, and the proportion of those who do 
not have a high school diploma is significantly lower. As education can have an effect on 
both overdue debts and employment, we will control for this variable in the multivariate 
regression model. 
The net income from work in the previous month is strongly correlated with declared 
and full-time jobs. The difference is significant in this respect, too, as those without over-
due debts have an income advantage of more than HUF 35,000. Figure 2 shows the distri-
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Figure 2. Distributions of net income in the subsamples of individuals with and without overdue 
debts. Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. 
We find that in the lower-income categories overdue debtors are significantly 
overrepresented. Returning to Table 2, bank account ownership is much (28 percentage 
points) lower among those with overdue debts, and the difference is significant, which is 
in line with our expectations. In the regression analysis, we examine bank account own-
ership in detail as a dependent variable. Few data are available on the size of the loan 
instalments and the data are not reliable because the respondents were uncertain about 
the instalments. 
Those with overdue debts have significantly more children and, thus, significantly 
larger families (see Table 2); this raises serious questions about child protection and inter-
generational social mobility (these issues, however, go beyond the scope of this study). In 
a household, per capita income is significantly higher where there is no overdue debt, but 
it is not much different from the individual incomes’ measures. Contrary to our previous 
expectations, there is no difference between the two groups in terms of whether there was 
a foreign currency loan in the family or not (Bethlendi 2011; Verner and Gyöngyösi 2020). 
At the household level, we define the so-called ability-to-pay ratio, which is the total 
monthly net income of the household divided by the total monthly expenditure. The fi-
nancial situation of a household is characterized by this ratio being below, equal to, or 
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Figure 3. Distributions of the ability-to-pay ratio in the subsamples of households with and without 
overdue debts. Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 
2019. 
As shown in Figure 3, a significant proportion of households—more than half—
spends all their monthly income for the living costs even in the subsample without over-
due debts, at least in terms of official incomes. Unsurprisingly, households that have dif-
ficulty financing their monthly living expenses have more overdue debts. 
In the questionnaire, we listed some behaviors that are mostly convicted by society. 
Respondents were asked to select and rank the five behaviors they believe are most con-
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Figure 4. Perceived social aversion (number of mentions among the first five most convicted behaviors). Source: Ques-
tionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. Note: The first five most convicted behaviors 
were ranked by the respondents (first: the most convicted behavior; second: the second most convicted behavior, etc.). 
Figure 4 shows that yelling and quarrelling on the street is believed to be the most 
convicted behavior; if we look at the number of first ranks (i.e., highest negative rank), it 
is drug use. Interestingly, non-payment of personal loans, utility bills, bank loans, and 
taxes are seen as much less negative behavior. Non-payment of official debts (utility bills, 
bank loans, taxes) in particular seems to be a “forgivable sin,” with only undeclared work 
and smoking being less convicted. 
Based on the responses in Figure 4, we assigned a composite index specific to the 
respondent—the perceived social aversion—separately to overdue debts and to unde-
clared work. The former was calculated so that the behaviors “overdue utility bills”, 
“overdue bank loan”, and “overdue tax” received 5 points if the behavior was ranked 
first; 4, if ranked second; 3, if ranked third; 2, if fourth; and 1, if fifth (zero, if not mentioned 
in the first five), and then these points were averaged over the three behaviors. The (per-
ceived) aversion to undeclared work was quantified in the same way (but it did not need 
to be averaged because there was only one such behavior). The variable of perceived social 
aversion reflects higher perceived rejection if its value is greater. This is a perception that 
contains objective and subjective elements; we did not separate these in our analysis. What 
matters for our estimates is what the respondent thinks about the level of aversion in his 
or her environment, as it may have a direct impact on loan repayments. 
In Table 2, the perceived social aversion to overdue debts is significantly smaller 
among those who have overdue debts, which seems logical. Interestingly, there is no dif-
ference between the two subsamples in terms of aversion to undeclared work. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of perceived social aversion to overdue debts across the two sub-
samples. 
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Figure 5. Distributions of the perceived social aversion to overdue debts in the subsamples with and without overdue 
debts. Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. 
Perceived social aversion to overdue debts differs significantly in the two subsam-
ples: those with overdue debts think less that society convicts them for this behavior and 
vice versa. 
The development of the settlement was measured with the Hungarian Central Sta-
tistical Office’s composite settlement indicator and a significant difference was found (see 
Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Distributions of the settlement development indicator in the subsamples of households with and without 
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The composite settlement indicator aggregates a number of different characteristics 
in terms of society, demography, housing and living conditions, the local economy and 
labor market, infrastructure and environment. In Figure 6, both subsamples show a two-
mode distribution, which can be explained by the settlement structure of BAZ County. 
Although difficult to discern in the figure, those with overdue debts typically live in less 
developed settlements. This difference may also affect both overdue debts and employ-
ment, therefore, we include this variable in the multivariate regression analysis in Section 
5. 
We can find one health variable in Table 2 that relates to the household, it is “chronic 
illness”, indicating whether there is a family member in the household not able to work 
due to poor health conditions, which occurs 10 times more frequently among those with 
overdue debts. The other health variables (addictions, health status, mental status, etc.), 
relating directly to the respondent, also show significant differences in favor of those with-
out overdue debts, with the exception of alcohol and medication. Surprisingly, there are 
more heavy drinkers among those without overdue debts, but the difference is significant 
only at the 10% level. In this respect, the fact that the majority of respondents are women 
may distort the picture. When investigating the impacts of overdue debts on health (H3), 
we compute an aggregate health index from the above variables. 
5. Multivariate Analysis 
In this section, we examine the variables’ overall effects on employment, bank ac-
count, and health in multivariate linear regression models, with a particular emphasis on 
overdue debts as a possible explanatory variable. The Ramsey RESET test supports the 
use of linear models in all three cases. The control variables in the linear regression models 
were chosen to meet two requirements. First, the questionnaire answers should be relia-
ble, and second, drawing a map of causality, we identified those variables that have an 
effect on both the dependent variable and the main explanatory variable (overdue debts); 
hence, their omission would have brought endogeneity to the model. For all independent 
variables, vector inflation factors are below 5, indicating no multicollinearity problems. 
We checked several specifications during the robustness tests, and the most realistic 
variants are presented below. 
Education is further detailed as a category variable: less than 8 classes of elementary 
school (reference point), elementary school, vocational exam, high school diploma, and 
university degree. In addition to age, the square of the age is also included in the model 
to take into account the potentially nonlinear relationship between age and employment. 
The detailed content of the variables is described in Section 4 and in Appendix A. 
5.1. Overdue Debts and Employment 
Our first hypothesis states that overdue debts have a negative effect on declared work 
because debtors try to avoid debt collections. In principle, overdue debts (especially mort-
gage loans) might affect labor supply through other channels as well (housing net worth, 
financial stress, housing lock, household debt overhang, etc). These causes, however, were 
not mentioned by the interviewees; thus, our analysis focuses only on the escape from 
debt collection channel.  
Table 3 shows the regression results separately for any type of declared work and for 
only the 8-h declared job (full-time job) as dependent variables.  
Table 3. Overdue debts and employment. 
    Y = Declared Work Y = Full-Time Job   
  N = 1131   N = 1131   
  Modified R2 = 0.250  Modified R2 = 0.244  
  Beta t p Beta t p 
C Intercept −0.80 −5.56 *** 0.000 −0.81 −5.73 *** 0.000 
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X Overdue debts −0.23 −5.96 *** 0.000 −0.21 −5.61 *** 0.000 
Z1 Gender (female) −0.15 −5.77 *** 0.000 −0.14 −5.52 *** 0.000 
Z2 Age 0.05 7.38 *** 0.000 0.05 7.48 *** 0.000 
Z2 Age^2 0.00 −6.98 *** 0.000 −0.00 −7.11 *** 0.000 
Z3 Education: Primary school 0.13 2.46 ** 0.014 0.11 1.99 ** 0.046 
Z3 Education: Vocational exam 0.36 6.45 *** 0.000 0.35 6.26 *** 0.000 
Z3 Education: High school diploma 0.42 6.94 *** 0.000 0.40 6.79 *** 0.000 
Z3 Education: University degree 0.53 6.64 *** 0.000 0.53 6.76 *** 0.000 
Z4 Ability-to-pay 0.00 −0.02 0.982 0.01 0.36 0.722 
Z5 Settlement development 0.00 2.46 ** 0.014 0.00 2.45 ** 0.014 
Z6 Chronic illness −0.06 −2.02 ** 0.044 −0.07 −2.29 ** 0.022 
Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. Note: The table summarizes the 
results of OLS regression models. C is the intercept, X is the main explanatory variable, and Zs are the control variables. 
In the case of education, the completion of fewer than 8 classes of elementary school is the reference. The results are similar 
when calculating robust standard errors. If the coefficients are significant at the levels of 1% or 5%, the p-values are marked 
with *** or **, respectively. 
As shown in Table 3, there is a strong relationship between declared work and over-
due debts; on average, ceteris paribus, the probability of having a registered job is 23 per-
centage points lower in the case of overdue debts. Middle-aged men with more degrees 
are more likely to have a declared job. The ability-to-pay ratio (total official net income of 
the household/total living expenses) is not significant for employment either economically 
or statistically; it is likely that the effect is (partly) overtaken by other variables like over-
due debts and education. There is a negative correlation between declared job and the 
variable “chronic illness”. The development of the settlement has a significant direct im-
pact on employment: one standard deviation increase in the value of this variable in-
creases the likelihood of having a registered job by almost 4 percentage points. If we ex-
amine the impact of overdue debts only on full-time jobs, we receive similar results.  
The question may arise as to whether the coefficients shown above also represent a 
direction of causality. Due to overdue debts, employment is lower or vice versa, and due 
to the lack of declared work, repayment is more difficult and therefore the probability of 
overdue debts will be higher (Ben-Galim and Lanning 2010; Balás et al. 2015; Campbell 
and Cocco 2015; Dimitrios et al. 2016). In the above model, we account for a number of 
explanatory variables affecting both overdue debts and employment, but it is worth con-
sidering what other potential confounding variables may be omitted from the analysis. 
Such omitted variables can be personality traits, such as reliability, accuracy, and consci-
entiousness, which are likely to have a negative impact on overdue debts and a positive 
impact on employment. Thus, these omitted variables are likely to skew the coefficient of 
overdue debts downwards. This could mean that the 23% and 21% negative impacts on 
declared work and full-time jobs, respectively, are overestimated. In absolute terms, 
somewhat smaller coefficients are more realistic. Patience and risk-taking may also be im-
portant additional missed variables, but their respective impacts are less clear. In any case, 
large negative coefficients are consistent with the results of the direct inquiry in Section 
4.1. 
Since our analysis focuses specifically on the “overdue debts → registered work” ef-
fect, we also examine the relationship through a specific instrumental variable, the per-
ceived social aversion to overdue debts. 
A suitable instrumental variable IV is required to (i) affect the assumed explanatory 
variable X, (ii) be independent of the control variables Zi, and (iii) have no direct impact 
on the outcome variable Y (only via X). In practice, it is usually difficult to find a variable 
that unarguably meets all expectations. We show below which results it leads to; if X is 
the overdue debts, Y is the declared job, and the IV is the perceived social aversion to 
overdue debts. 
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Figures 4 and 5 show the distribution of perceived social aversion of each behavior 
in the studied population. To recap, interviewees were asked to select from a pre-defined 
list and rank the five most convicted behavioral patterns, based on which we calculated a 
composite indicator for overdue debts (utility bills, bank loans, tax). We then extended 
this indicator to all members of the household. 
The composite indicator—the perceived social aversion to overdue debts—is pre-
sumably not strongly related to the control variables as the question refers to the opinion 
of the village. At the same time, it is possible that the individual view on the opinion of 
the village is also determined by individual and household characteristics. In any case, in 
our sample, the perceived social aversion to overdue debts hardly correlates with any 
other control variables; therefore, the hypothesis of independence cannot be rejected. It is 
possible that there is a link between various deviant behaviors, such as undeclared work 
and refusal to pay loans. However, we did not find any indication of this in a statistical 
sense. It is also possible that societal expectations may change, for example, because of an 
exogenous shock. The foreign currency credit crisis in Hungary (Bethlendi 2011) could be 
considered as an exogenous shock, as a result of which, the society may become less likely 
to convict those who do not pay their debts if the proportion of non-paying households 
increases (Becker and Murphy 2000). In our database, however, there is no significant re-
lationship between foreign currency loans and the perceived social aversion (Mann–Whit-
ney test p value is 0.391). The relationship is examined by breaking down by settlements, 
but the t-tests and Mann–Whitney tests do not indicate a relationship between the two 
variables. Further, the development of the settlement can, in principle, be related to social 
aversions, but we do not see a close correlation here either (+0.05). Logically, we can as-
sume that the perceived social aversion to overdue debts affects the repayment of loans 
but does not directly affect employment, except through the channel of overdue debts, so 
it can be considered as a suitable instrumental variable in this context. 
In a linear probability model (LPM), we first regress the variable X (overdue debts) 
and then the variable Y (declared work) on the IV (perceived social aversion to overdue 
debts), and we get the values of −0.033 and +0.133 for the coefficients (the standard error 
is 0.018 and 0.024, respectively), which implies 0.133/−0.033 = −4.03 coefficient for the re-
lationship between X and Y. Although the signs are as expected, the coefficient of 4.03 is 
incomprehensible in the LPM. By performing the same analysis but in a logit regression 
model, we conclude that overdue debts reduce the chances of the debtor having a declared 
job by 14%. 
Despite the theoretical and practical limitations of our analysis based on the selected 
instrumental variable, the estimated coefficient of 14% seems realistic, considering the re-
sults of the in-depth interviews, direct interviews, and multivariate regression analyses 
accounting for the effects of the potential omitted variables. Bernstein (2017) found on a 
sample of US mortgage borrowers representative for the whole population that overdue 
debts decrease employability by 2–6%. Our estimate (14%) is much higher, not least be-
cause our sample is representative of people living in small villages in one of the most 
disadvantaged counties of Hungary. 
5.2. Overdue Debts and Bank Account  
As a next step, we examine our second hypothesis more closely, namely that overdue 
debts have a negative effect on bank account ownership. Bank account ownership is the 
best proxy for financial inclusion as this is the prerequisite for all other financial services 
(Allen et al. 2016). Several studies showed a close relationship between declared work and 
a bank account (Illyés and Varga 2015; Koku 2015; Allen et al. 2016; Krumer-Nevo et al. 
2017; Horn and Kiss 2019; Fernández-Olit et al. 2019). Thus, if overdue debts negatively 
affect declared work (see Table 3), these can indirectly affect bank accounts too. However, 
based on the in-depth interviews, we assume that there is a direct channel between over-
due debts and the bank account, as well, through the escape from debt collection channel. 
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Table 4 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis. To make our results com-
parable with the results of similar, albeit nationally representative research (Illyés and 
Varga 2015; Horn and Kiss 2019), we extended our regression model with net income and 
declared work. 
Table 4. Overdue debts and bank accounts. 
    Y = Bank Account 
    N = 1131 Modified R2 = 0.323 
   Beta t p 
C Intercept −0.14 −0.97 0.332 
X Overdue debts −0.09 −2.31 ** 0.021 
Z1 Gender (female) 0.08 3.14 *** 0.002 
Z2 Age 0.00 0.50 0.620 
Z2 Age^2 0.00 −0.61 0.541 
Z3 Education: Elementary school 0.07 1.27 0.204 
Z3 Education: Vocational exam 0.21 3.78 *** 0.000 
Z3 Education: High school diploma 0.32 5.38 *** 0.000 
Z3 Education: University degree 0.40 5.00 *** 0.000 
Z4 Net income 0.00 5.78 *** 0.000 
Z5 Ability-to-pay ratio 0.03 1.01 0.312 
Z6 Chronic illness −0.04 −1.14 0.256 
Z7 Declared work 0.21 6.52 *** 0.000 
Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. Note: The 
table summarizes the results of the OLS-based regression model. C is the intercept, X is the main 
explanatory variable, and the Zs are the control variables. In the case of education, the completion 
of fewer than 8 classes of elementary school is the reference. Instead of settlement development, we 
applied district dummy variables. The results are similar when calculating robust standard errors. 
If the coefficients are significant at the levels of 1% or 5%, the p-values are marked with *** or **,  
respectively. 
Opening a bank account is impacted by the banking services’ accessibility which is 
not necessarily reflected in the settlement development indicator. Therefore, we used dis-
trict dummy variables instead of the settlement development indicator. District dummies 
proved to be significant, indicating remarkable differences between different regions in 
terms of the available banking services. 
According to Table 4, overdue debts are negatively related to bank accounts: if an 
individual has overdue debts, the likelihood of using a bank account decreases by 9 per-
centage points on average ceteris paribus. A declared job increases the chances of using a 
bank account by 21 percentage points, and, in line with our expectations, the income has 
a positive impact on bank account ownership. If net income and employment is left out 
from the model, the coefficient of overdue debts increases to 15 percentage points.  
Women are more likely to open a bank account, but this finding is not robust across 
different model specifications. The use of a bank account initially increases with age, 
which is consistent with the results of (Illyés and Varga 2015; Horn and Kiss 2019). How-
ever, in our sample, there is no subsequent negative effect of age, probably because we 
only examined those of active age (18–65 years). Education also has a strong effect on our 
dataset: the higher the degree, the higher the probability of having a bank account, and 
the magnitude of this effect is similar to the findings of (Illyés and Varga 2015; Horn and 
Kiss 2019). The coefficients of the variables “ability-to-pay” and “chronic illness” have the 
expected sign, but they are only significant in model specifications without the net income 
and employment variables.  
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5.3. Overdue Debts and Health 
In this section, we investigate our third hypothesis i.e., overdue debts have a negative 
impact on health. Health is measured by a factor derived from 10 variables related to men-
tal and physical health (smoking, alcohol, medication, stressed, hopeless, tired, unhappy, 
no socializing, dissatisfied with health, and chronic illness) using a principal component 
analysis. Based on the KMO value (=0.605) and the Bartlett test (p-value is 0.000), we de-
termined one common factor, the so-called unhealthy index. The higher the value of the 
unhealthy index, the worse the health condition of the individual (the value of the index 
varies between −1.54 and +2.37). In Table 5, the outcome variable is the unhealthy index 
and the main explanatory variable is overdue debts again, and we control for important 
individual-, household-, and settlement-level variables. 
Variables determining the unhealthy index are known only for the respondents, 
therefore, in this model, the number of cases is only 480 (some did not provide the infor-
mation needed to produce the unhealthy index). While in the case of employment and the 
bank account, the negative effects occur only in the case of a person with overdue debts; 
the stress caused by overdue debts can destroy the mental and physical health of the 
whole family. So, in this model, the main explanatory variable—overdue debts—indicates 
whether there are overdue debts in a given household or not. 
Table 5. Overdue debts and health. 
    Y = Unhealthy Index Y = Unhealthy Index 
    N = 481 Modified R2 = 0.322 N = 480 Modified R2 = 0.328 
   Beta t p Beta t p 
C Intercept 0.17 0.71 0.479 0.12 0.47 0.636 
X Overdue debts in the household 0.23 4.88 *** 0.000 0.21 4.36 *** 0.000 
Z1 Gender (female) 0.07 1.73 ** 0.084 0.07 1.56 0.120 
Z2 Age 0.01 0.69 0.491 0.01 0.93 0.353 
Z2 Age^2 0.00 0.58 0.561 0.00 0.29 0.772 
Z3 Education: Elementary school −0.09 −1.14 0.256 −0.09 −1.09 0.276 
Z3 Education: Vocational exam −0.29 −3.46 *** 0.001 −0.28 −3.30 *** 0.001 
Z3 Education: High school diploma −0.30 −3.33 *** 0.001 −0.28 −3.12 *** 0.002 
Z3 Education: University degree −0.51 −4.53 *** 0.000 −0.51 −4.28 *** 0.000 
Z4 Net income    0.00 0.58 0.560 
Z5 Forex loan    0.05 1.08 0.283 
Z6 Ability-to-pay ratio −0.09 −2.51 *** 0.013 −0.09 −2.52 *** 0.012 
Z7 Settlement development 0.00 −1.35 0.177 0.00 −1.20 0.231 
8 Declared work    −0.10 −1.83 ** 0.069 
Source: Questionnaire-based survey, small settlements of BAZ County, Hungary, 2019. Note: The table summarizes the 
results of OLS-based regression models. C is the intercept, X is the main explanatory variable, and Zs are the control 
variables. In the case of education, the completion of fewer than 8 classes of elementary school is the reference. The results 
are similar when calculating robust standard errors. If the coefficients are significant at the levels of 1% or 5%, the p−values 
are marked with *** or **, respectively. 
As expected, the sign of the coefficient of overdue debts is positive and significant in 
both specifications, which means that overdue debts destroy health. Table 5 also suggests 
that, in absolute terms, the size effect of overdue debts on health is comparable to that of 
a vocational exam or a high school diploma after completing elementary school. Age is 
not significant, but gender is, women have slightly worse health in this sample. Education 
matters again, the more someone studies, the healthier they live. Similarly, the ability-to-
pay ratio, which is a more balanced family budget, has a positive impact on health too. 
Net income is irrelevant, and surprisingly, declared work has a weak negative impact on 
health. Having had a foreign currency loan in the past has no significant impact. Similarly, 
the settlement development is not significant, and controlling for this effect at the district 
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level instead of the settlement level does not significantly change the results. The above 
models, thus, support the negative relationship between overdue debts and health re-
vealed during the in-depth interviews and through the direct inquiries. 
6. Conclusions 
We examine the negative impacts of overdue debts on employment, bank accounts, 
and health using several methods (in-depth interviews, direct inquiries, and statistical 
analyses). According to our estimations, overdue debts reduce the likelihood of having a 
declared job by nearly 14 percentage points. Not having a declared job reduces the prob-
ability of owning a bank account by 21 percentage points; in addition, overdue debts fur-
ther decrease the probability of having a bank account by 9 percentage points. Further-
more, overdue debts have a negative effect on the health of the family members living in 
the household of the debtor, and this negative effect is roughly of the same magnitude as 
the positive impact of obtaining a vocational certificate or a high school diploma after 
completing primary school. 
Overdue debts slow down economic growth not only through the decreased labor 
demand, as (Mian and Sufi 2014; Verner and Gyöngyösi 2020) showed, but also through 
the decreased labor supply as we presented. Overdue debts can have negative effects not 
only in a crisis but also in a boom for many decades thereafter.  
Our research methodology has limitations. Most of all, one can never be sure that 
endogeneity is fully excluded from the models. Endogeneity can emerge from simultane-
ous causality, omitted variables, and measurement errors (Bascle 2008). In our multivari-
ate regression models with control variables, all three are relevant issues. Therefore, we 
performed an additional analysis using an instrumental variable (perceived social aver-
sion to overdue debts) as well. Literature review, in-depth interviews, direct inquiries, 
multivariate analysis, instrumental variable method, and robustness checks strengthen 
each other and indicate that our results are reliable. The intuitive new channel (escape from 
debt collection) and the comprehensive and representative survey data also add to the qual-
ity of our research. 
We can conclude that overdue bills, tax, and bank loans have similar effects on em-
ployment, bank services, and health through the escape from debt collection channel. The 
estimated size effects refer to a disadvantaged population in Hungary, and these proved 
to be highly significant in economic terms. Results can be generalized for other popula-
tions of overdue debtors, too, as debt collection can create perverse incentives and poverty 
trap mechanisms everywhere if overdue debts are not settled effectively. Of course, side 
effects can vary widely depending on institutions, personal bankruptcy systems, labor 
market tendencies, cultural factors, etc. 
To reduce the negative social and economic impacts of overdue debts, policymakers 
should pay more attention to attenuating credit cycles (debt control rules, consumer pro-
tection, and other anticyclical policies) and settling non-performing debts, especially in 
this fragile segment of the society. 
Thus, specific debt relief programs are needed, and state intervention can be justified 
by the positive external effects in terms of employment, growth, tax income, subsidies, 
health care costs, children’s perspective, black economy, etc. Most of all, we argue in favor 
of more lenient personal bankruptcy regulations to promote the fresh start of overdue 
borrowers and their families. A bad financial decision should not ruin entire families.  
Market-based debt renegotiations should also be more effective for example by using 
FinTech solutions (for example, online platforms for renegotiations and bargaining, in-
come-contingent repayments, smart contracts and decentralized clearing, etc.). According 
to (Kshetri 2017; Fernández-Olit et al. 2019) this is an under-researched but promising 
direction. 
Our results indicate that well-designed debt relief programs could be attractive for 
borrowers, too, as hiding from credit collectors for a lifetime has high personal costs. In 
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these programs, moral hazard issues should be carefully addressed. International evi-
dence suggests, however, that moral hazard can be much less serious as it is widely be-
lieved (Guiso et al. 2013; Bhutta et al. 2017). 
As far as development policies are concerned, we believe that financial inclusion is 
not possible without the settlement of existing overdue debts. This must be the first step 
and well before promoting saving accounts and regular savings plans. 
Our database is not suitable for estimating the extent of the problem at the national 
level. This would require a sufficiently detailed representative sample of the entire popu-
lation with a large number of observations. A critical study of existing debt relief pro-
grams and the development of possible solutions would also require a separate study. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Description of variables. 
 Variable Description 
0 Overdue debts 
The value is 1 if the individual has any formal overdue debts (loan, utility bills, tax), otherwise 0, 
for each active age member of the household.  
1 Full-time job 
The value is 1 if the individual has a full-time registered job (public work excluded), otherwise 
0, for each active age member of the household. 
2 Declared work  
The value is 1 if the individual has full or part time declared job, otherwise 0, for each active age 
member of the household. 
3 Gender The value is 0 if male, 1 if female, for each member of the household.  
4 Age Calculated based on the year of birth, in years, for each member of the household. 
5 Education 
Category variable indicating five categories: less than 8 classes of elementary school, elementary 
school, vocational exam, high school diploma, university degree. For each member of the 
household. 
6 Net income  
Net amount in thousand HUF received last month from employment (including pension, 
caretaking support, unemployment benefit, child-support, maternity, etc.). For each active-age 
member of the household. 
7 Bank account If the individual has a bank account, the value is 1, otherwise 0. 
8 Loan instalment 
Instalment (in thousand HUF) of the individual’s bank loan(s), for each active-age member of 




Number of household members living under the same postal address (weight is 1 if above 18 
years, 0.5 if below 18 years of age).  
10 Children 
Number of children (below the age of 18) living in the same household (i.e., under the same 
postal address) (weight is 1 for all children).  
11 Income per capita 
Sum of net incomes of all household members divided by the weighted number of household 
members. 
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12 Forex loan 
If somebody in the household had (ever) taken out a foreign exchange denominated loan, the 









Perceived social aversion to the non-payment of utility bills, loans, tax according to the 
respondent (higher value, greater aversion). 
15 
Perceived social 
aversion to black 
work 





Settlement development indicator based on societal, demographic, living conditions, local 
economic, employment-related, infrastructural, and environmental factors) 
17 Chronic illness 
The value is 1 if there is someone in the household, whose health condition prevents 
employment, otherwise 0.  
18 Smoking If the individual is smoking regularly, the value is 1, otherwise 0. 
19 Alcohol If the respondent consumes alcohol more than once a week, the value is 1, otherwise 0. 
20 Medication If there is anyone in the family who permanently needs medication, the value is 1, otherwise 0. 
21 Stressed 
If the respondent was stressed for more than half of the days in the last two weeks, the value is 
1, otherwise 0.  
22 Hopeless 
If the respondent was hopeless for more than half of the days in the last two weeks, the value is 
1, otherwise 0. 
23 Tired 
If the respondent was tired for more than half of the days in the last two weeks, the value is 1, 
otherwise 0. 
24 Unhappy 
If the respondent was unhappy for more than half of the days in the last two weeks, the value is 
1, otherwise 0. 
25 Not socializing 
The value is 1 if the individual goes out (religious, cultural, sport, recreational purposes) less 




The value is 1, if the individual is totally or rather satisfied with her/his health, otherwise 0.  
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